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Introduction
Digital proximity tracing apps are a health technology de-
signed to speed up the tracing of contacts of people found
to be infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Apps have been released in sev-
eral countries, including Switzerland, as additional mea-
sures to combat the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic [1].
Developers started work on the apps early in the pandemic,
when the numbers of cases of coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) were increasing quickly and classic, inter-
view-based, contact tracing services became overwhelmed
[2]. A mathematical study, first published as a preprint
in March 2020, found that, because SARS-CoV-2 can be
transmitted before the symptoms are apparent, classic, in-
terview-based contact tracing is too slow to control trans-
mission [3].
Digital proximity tracing is based on practical hardware
technologies (e.g., Bluetooth low energy), but has under-
gone only limited real-life testing [1]. The effects of digital
proximity tracing, either alone or as an adjunct to classic
contact tracing, have not yet been shown. Effectiveness
will depend as much on factors such as public confidence
and trust in protection of privacy, which affect uptake and
adherence with recommended actions, as on technical per-
formance [4]. Research programmes will need to accom-
pany the release of proximity tracing apps to assess how
well they work, whether they produce the desired effects,
and how technological, acceptability and usability aspects
can be further optimised. In this article, we summarise how
digital proximity tracing and classic contact tracing should
work, we discuss methods for their evaluation, and present
an agenda for research to assess the benefits, harms and
costs of this new technology during an epidemic. To this
end, we use the frameworks of health technology assess-
ment [5] and comparative effectiveness studies in clinical
research [6]. Key words printed in italics are defined in ap-
pendix 1.
How should a proximity tracing app work?
Proximity tracing apps are designed to trigger a notifica-
tion on a smartphone when their user has been exposed to
one or more people with confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection
(index cases) who are also using the app. In brief, digital
proximity tracing enables estimation of the exposure of an
app user to other users using the same app, via low energy
Bluetooth signals. The app sends and receives ephemeral
(regularly changing), pseudo-random identification num-
bers (IDs). The SwissCovid app uses decentralised digital
privacy-preserving proximity tracing (D3-PT) protocols
that store only contact data on the phone, thus protecting
the privacy of the user [7, 8]. Signal strength and cumula-
tive duration of all observed contact events using this pro-
tocol are stored locally on the phone for 14 days. If app
users receive a positive result for active SARS-CoV-2 in-
fection, by reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) testing, they can upload the ephemeral IDs that
were transmitted during the contagious period, e.g., start-
ing 2 days before the date of symptom onset, from their
phone onto a central server.
All phones using the proximity tracing app periodically
connect to the central server and compare their locally
stored list of recorded ephemeral IDs with the list obtained
from the server. The smartphone will determine whether
the cumulative time and distance derived from identified
matches between ephemeral IDs marked as contagious and
locally stored, observed IDs, indicate sufficient exposure
to an infected person, for example, proximity of <1.5 m
for a total of 15 minutes. If this is the case, this person (a
contact) will receive an exposure notification through the
proximity tracing app, and information on how to proceed,
e.g., to call a telephone information line. If deemed neces-
sary, the contact will be advised to go into quarantine and,
if infected, they might not have transmitted SARS-CoV-2
onwards. The mechanism of proximity tracing, its connec-
tion to classical contact tracing and the epidemiological ra-
tionale have been discussed elsewhere [8]. Although exact
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procedures will vary across countries, the overall principle
is expected to be the same.
How should a proximity tracing app work with
classic contact tracing?
Classic, interview-based contact tracing is one part of the
test, trace, isolate, quarantine (TTIQ) package of inter-
ventions to help control SARS-CoV-2 transmission [9].
Classic contact tracing begins when a person with SARS-
CoV-2 infection (an index case) receives the diagnosis.
Testing for SARS-CoV-2 is usually prompted by symp-
toms. Because presymptomatic transmission is possible 1
to 3 days before symptom onset [10], the index case might
already have transmitted infection to others when they are
tested. It may then take several days before the index case
receives the result, has a contact tracing interview, and
contacts are notified and begin quarantine. Proximity trac-
ing apps are intended to accelerate the last step of con-
tact notification; the app alerts potentially exposed users
as soon as the index case receives his/her positive test re-
sult and activates the upload of his/her ephemeral IDs onto
the central server. Proximity tracing app users who receive
an alert can immediately contact an adviser on a telephone
hotline and start quarantine earlier. The app can also ex-
tend the reach of classic contact tracing because it sends
alerts to people who might not be known to an index case.
Furthermore, proximity tracing will still function in a sit-
uation when classic contact tracing gets overwhelmed by
high numbers of new infections.
Proximity tracing app evaluation should be
scaled up immediately
Large-scale assessments of proximity tracing apps in real-
world populations are still lacking and will likely have to
wait until the apps have been rolled out. This is because the
release of lockdown measures in many countries has put
pressure on health authorities to deploy apps as quickly as
possible to support other pandemic containment measures,
with limited time for extensive testing and optimisation.
A research programme can be implemented more easily
when transmission is still under control. As of 1 July 2020,
the number of new cases of COVID-19 is still relatively
low in several countries that have introduced proximity
tracing apps, but is increasing. Whereas low, stable num-
bers of new cases are usually manageable for classic con-
tact tracing, clusters of infection and super-spreading event
outbreaks can quickly overwhelm capacity. If classic con-
tact tracing is suspended, however, the collection of im-
portant information for proximity tracing app evaluation
would be impaired.
Proposal for a pragmatic proximity tracing ef-
fectiveness research agenda
Proximity tracing apps are a health technology. The frame-
work of health technology assessment addresses different
dimensions and properties of proximity tracing apps, in-
cluding technical properties, uptake, adherence, safety, ef-
ficacy or effectiveness, economic attributes or impacts and
social, legal, ethical and political impacts (fig. 1) [5]. Spe-
cific study questions for each aspect require appropriate
study designs and outcome measures, using a range of
quantitative and qualitative health services research meth-
ods. Given the differences between the dimensions of
health technology assessment, research teams should be in-
terdisciplinary, drawing expertise from diverse fields such
as epidemiology, virology, statistics, mathematical model-
ling, health economics, psychology, and other social sci-
ences.
We propose a research agenda that includes six interdepen-
dent pillars, which should result in iterative improvements
in proximity tracing apps. For each pillar, we outline the
rationale and main research questions and methods (fig. 1
and table 1).
Figure 1: Research domains for comprehensive proximity tracing (PT) effectiveness evaluation, based on the health technology assessment
framework. Numbered topics in each box are referred to as “pillars” in the text.
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Technical optimisation
Initial studies of proximity tracing apps should focus on
technical improvement (fig. 1), such as improving the ex-
posure estimation algorithm based on reliable low energy
Bluetooth measurements. Most researchers agree that the
definition of close contact according to distance and dura-
tion, e.g., <1.5 m for 15 minutes or more, should be scru-
tinised from technical and epidemiological perspectives.
Studies should assess the reliability of exposure measure-
ment as sensitivity (the ability of proximity tracing to cor-
rectly identify persons with real risk exposures), and speci-
ficity (the ability to correctly identify persons without risk
exposures). The fractions of true positive and false positive
risk exposure alarms will be of particular interest. False
positive notifications denote triggered warnings when
there was objectively no risk for transmission of SARS-
CoV-2. They can occur for different reasons. For example,
false positive notifications can be triggered by measure-
ment inaccuracy and exposure risk misclassifications, that
is, the actual distance and duration of contact exposure
to index cases were insufficient for transmission, but the
app inaccurately identified a potential exposure risk. Other
false positive warnings can occur if barriers (such as plexi-
glass walls) or protective measures (protective gear such as
masks worn by index case and contact) effectively prevent-
ed transmission, but were not recognisable by the proximi-
ty tracing app.
Epidemiological studies are needed to determine the per-
centage of persons alerted by the proximity tracing app
who eventually develop symptoms or test positive for
SARS-CoV-2. This will be a biological outcome measure
of the “quality” of warnings (in terms of proportions of
true positives and false positives) and could provide in-
formation for further fine-tuning of exposure definitions.
Studies of social and ethical aspects are also needed (pillar
6). From the perspective of preventing SARS-CoV-2 trans-
mission, it might be desirable to err on the side of sending
more persons into quarantine, rather than to miss a po-
tential exposure. However, putting a large number of con-
tacts into quarantine is probably unacceptable from a social
and economic viewpoint because quarantine is disruptive
to personal lives and the economic costs due to income
and productivity losses can be substantial. The findings of
these studies should feed back into, and inform, an iterative
process of technical calibration to find an optimal balance
between the different evaluation dimensions (the different
pillars in fig. 1).
Uptake
Automated systems record the number of downloads of the
app. By 4 July 2020, five days after its release, >1,000,000
people were already actively using the SwissCovid app
[11]. In addition to the number of users, as outlined in fig-
ure 1, pillar 2, researchers should examine users’ social
and demographic characteristics in random samples of the
general population in repeated cross-sectional surveys. The
demographic characteristics of proximity tracing app users
could then be compared with the characteristics of people
newly diagnosed with COVID-19 in the same time period.
If the characteristics of these groups differ, there may be a
need to find ways to increase proximity tracing app uptake
in certain population groups.
Acceptability, adherence, usage
Research about whether and how people use the proximity
tracing app has analogies with the assessment of medica-
Table 1: Pillars of health technology assessment for proximity tracing (PT) apps, research questions, study designs and possible outcome measures.
Pillar Research question Study designs Possible outcomes
1. Technical optimisation How reliable is the detection of signal strength by Blue-
tooth low energy algorithm?
Laboratory measurement Refined Bluetooth signal attenuation
How accurately does the PT app define a close con-
tact?
Test accuracy study Sensitivity, specificity
% of alerted users who are infected
2. Uptake What is the uptake of the PT app?
How does PT app uptake differ in the whole population,
amongst those with smartphones, and amongst those
with up to date smartphones?
Downloads
Smartphone usage statistics
Cross-sectional surveys
% population downloaded
% survey respondents reporting use
3. Acceptability, adherence Why do people download a PT app, or not?
Are users adequately informed about the privacy pro-
tections and potential risks associated with the app
use?
How do users and non-users assess issues of trust and
privacy? Were there adverse experiences?
Cross-sectional surveys
Qualitative studies
Reasons for use or non-use
Perspectives and views of app users or
non-users
Do people follow the PT app instructions when alerted? Contact tracing data
App use data
Cross-sectional surveys
% notified persons who call information
service
4. Efficacy, effectiveness, safety Does the PT app identify more contacts or identify con-
tacts more quickly than classic contact tracing?
Randomised controlled trial
Cohort study
Before-and-after study
Number of contacts per index case
Time from index case diagnosis to noti-
fication or quarantine
Does the PT app reduce onward transmission of SARS-
CoV-2?
Randomised controlled trial
Cohort study
Attack rates
What is the country-level effectiveness of PT apps?
What is their contribution to transmission prevention
compared with other measures?
Mathematical modelling study Reduction in incidence
Averted cases
5. Economic impact Is the app cost-effective? Economic impact studies Direct and indirect costs of apps
Cost per contact identified
Cost per prevented case
6. Social, legal and ethical aspects Does PT app use or non-use have unwanted ethical,
societal consequences?
Do users have the right to challenge notification alerts?
What is the oversight mechanism of the PT app and
how transparently does it operate?
Qualitative research methods
Legal opinion
Discrimination
Stigmatisation
Surveillance attitudes
Public accountability
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tion adherence (“drugs don’t work in people who don’t
take them”) [12]. Findings from such studies will help to
elucidate the uptake of proximity tracing apps in the target
population and to assess the strength of public support and
trust in the apps. The decentralised protocols of the Swiss-
Covid app mean that very limited data are available about
usage of the app. Additional studies (fig. 1, pillar 3) will
therefore be needed to examine whether app users are fol-
lowing recommendations, that is, whether they call the in-
foline in the event of an exposure notification or whether
they enter positive test results into the app to trigger noti-
fications. A cross-sectional study could collect these data
by inviting proximity tracing app users at random to com-
plete an anonymised survey on their motivations for app
usage and response to exposure notifications. Qualitative
research can explore issues such as reasons why people do
not use proximity tracing apps, or concerns about priva-
cy. International, comparative studies could examine atti-
tudes and behaviours in different places that have intro-
duced centralised or decentralised proximity tracing apps.
Efficacy and effectiveness
The overall goal of proximity tracing apps is to break
chains of SARS-CoV-2 transmission by leading to swifter
identification of close contacts and implementation of test-
ing and quarantine than with classic contact tracing alone.
Proximity tracing can also potentially reach persons who
are not socially connected (or known by name) to the index
case and would therefore be missed by classic contact trac-
ing. Pillar 4 (fig. 1) is at the heart of effectiveness research.
The design of studies and the outcomes measured depend
on the stage during an epidemic at which a proximity trac-
ing app is introduced and the availability of data for mea-
suring intermediate process outcomes or biological out-
comes of the endpoints of contact tracing (fig. 2).
Should we assess efficacy or effectiveness?
In clinical drug research, the concept of efficacy defines
the effect of an intervention under optimal circumstances,
which might not reflect real-life settings [13]. In practice,
proximity tracing apps are not a standalone technology.
They are an adjunct to classic contact tracing, and human
interactions are needed to help judge the relevance of an
alert and to guide and support testing and quarantine. Re-
search should therefore be aimed at the evaluation of effec-
tiveness of proximity tracing apps in the real-life settings
in which they will be used [13]. There are different study
designs that can be used to assess effectiveness at different
stages of the contact tracing pathway.
Randomised controlled trials
Randomisation allows causal inference about the effects of
an intervention on an outcome. Because SARS-CoV-2 is
transmissible through direct contact and people are mobile,
whole communities, towns or regions (clusters) should be
randomised [14]. Cluster-randomised trials could compare
the effects of proximity tracing apps introduced earlier or
later. Outcomes could be measured at the individual lev-
el within clusters and at the population level in terms of
transmission [15]. The design of cluster-randomised trials
presents methodological, logistic, and ethical challenges.
Where proximity tracing apps have already been made
available in a whole country, it would not be possible to
restrict their use to certain areas. Also, the course and ge-
ographic distribution of SARS-CoV-2 transmission might
not allow for staggered app release or balanced randomisa-
tion. Even in countries with severe COVID-19 epidemics,
the absolute incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection is low, so
randomised controlled trials would need to be very large.
Observational study designs
Effectiveness can be assessed using non-randomised ob-
servational study designs, accompanying the introduction
of proximity tracing app release, and gathering data while
the apps are in use. When access to proximity tracing
apps has not been assigned at random, users and non-users
of the apps and areas with differing levels of app usage
will differ in ways that might be associated with the out-
comes of interest (confounding) [16]. For example, app
users might be more likely than non-users to wear masks,
or practice more social distancing. Data about these poten-
tial confounding factors should be collected so that they
can be controlled for in statistical analysis.
Figure 2: Stages in the effectiveness pathway for proximity tracing apps.
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Outcomes
The choice of study outcomes will have implications for
proximity tracing app effectiveness evaluations. These out-
comes should be measurable in a reliable (obtaining the
same result when repeating measurements) and valid man-
ner (to measure what is intended) [16]. However, proxim-
ity tracing app evaluations are challenged by the fact that
the main event of interest, SARS-CoV-2 transmission, is
not directly observable.
There are multiple stages at which the outcomes of prox-
imity tracing app use, and classic contact tracing as a com-
parator and means for data collection, can be measured
(fig. 2). The goal is to contribute to reduced SARS-CoV-2
transmission and deaths from COVID-19 in a population.
The attack rate has been recommended as an outcome mea-
sure [17, 18]. The attack rate is the proportion of contacts
exposed to a SARS-CoV-2 index case who become infect-
ed. To determine the influence of a proximity tracing app
on the attack rate requires detailed information for each
new index case about the infection status of each identified
contact, and whether the contact was identified through
classic contact tracing or an app alert. Most contacts who
go into quarantine do not get tested for SARS-CoV-2, so
large prospective cohort studies would be needed.
Studies to evaluate proximity tracing apps could also as-
sess the intermediate steps in the contact tracing pathway
before the biological endpoint of new SARS-CoV-2 in-
fection. The frequency of each intermediate outcome can
be assessed prospectively, together with information about
exposure to classic contact tracing of the proximity tracing
app. If the outcomes are strongly associated with the bio-
logical endpoint, they can be used as surrogate (or proxy)
outcomes [19]. For example, proximity tracing apps could
be evaluated by comparing the time-to-notification
through classic contact tracing and through proximity trac-
ing apps in persons who are notified by both systems.
Comparator
The use of proximity tracing apps is embedded in the
broader TTIQ surveillance and response strategy to contain
the epidemic [18, 20]. The relevant question for the ef-
fectiveness is not whether these apps alone can stop the
SARS-CoV-2 epidemic, but whether their benefits increase
the contribution of classic contact tracing, whilst out-
weighing the harms and being cost-effective and socially
acceptable. In clinical research, this type of evaluation is
referred to as comparative effectiveness studies [6].
There are also study questions and contexts in which prox-
imity tracing apps could be compared with other interven-
tions. For example, comparative studies aiming at deciding
between different containment strategy options may war-
rant comparisons with more invasive measures, such as a
mandate to wear masks in public transport systems or pro-
hibition of mass gatherings and certain business activities.
Although such evaluations may seem like “comparing ap-
ples to pears”, they can be informative when, for example,
scaling the number of prevented cases by a measure with
monetary costs, such as in a cost-benefit assessment.
Mathematical modelling studies
Mathematical models of SARS-CoV-2 transmission can be
used to assess the impact of interventions, including prox-
imity tracing apps, at the population level. Mathematical
modelling studies have some advantages over empirical
studies for the evaluation of interventions for infectious
disease control, especially where randomised controlled
trials are logistically unfeasible. The outcomes that are
measured in epidemiological studies, such as attack rate,
give information at the level of a small cluster or commu-
nity. Empirical studies cannot provide information about
what is likely to happen at the population level because
they are not long-term enough to capture the dynamic ef-
fects of an intervention on transmission [21].
The collection of empirical data about the uptake of prox-
imity tracing apps, the numbers of alerts generated and the
outcomes along the contact tracing pathway, including at-
tack rates and infection incidence (fig. 2) is essential to im-
prove the outputs of models developed with theoretical in-
put data [3, 22, 23]. Mathematical models can also be used
to examine the impacts of setting-specific features, such as
how the TTIQ strategy is implemented in a country, across
a range of plausible assumptions and existing data. Prox-
imity tracing evaluation studies should be designed with
mathematical modellers, so that information that they need
for model parameters is captured accurately in epidemio-
logical studies.
Economic evaluation
Comprehensive assessment of proximity tracing apps as a
health technology includes evaluation of cost utility. Eco-
nomic evaluation can include the direct and indirect fi-
nancial costs of managing a SARS-CoV-2 epidemic, as
well as the harms such as psychological stress, worsening
of chronic diseases due to delayed care, breaches of pri-
vacy, or negative impacts on children’s education due to
school closures. Research studies should therefore inves-
tigate whether proximity tracing apps are an efficient use
of resources when compared with other containment mea-
sures, such as mandatory mask wearing, efficiency studies
should examine whether proximity tracing can achieve re-
ductions of secondary transmissions at lower monetary or
societal costs than an alternative measure. In particular,
studies should assess whether proximity tracing can iden-
tify exposed persons or avert transmissions at lower costs
than other pandemic containment measures.
Social, ethical and legal aspects
Ethical issues about the digital proximity tracing apps and
their introduction have been discussed in some detail [4,
23–25]. Additional studies should be carried out as part of
the health technology assessment, such as those outlined in
pillar 3 (adherence).
Challenges for proximity tracing app research
agendas
Country-specific factors
Several countries are developing or have released proxim-
ity tracing apps. The apps differ in their architecture, using
centralised or decentralised collection of data for the iden-
tification of exposure risks, technical app specifications,
or embedding of apps in the overall surveillance and re-
sponse strategy. Results in a specific country might not be
generalisable. This is because effectiveness, when com-
prehensively defined, is highly dependent on a country’s
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containment strategy, health system characteristics and in-
centives provided for individuals to enter quarantine in
the case of proximity tracing app notifications. Neverthe-
less, to achieve greater efficiency, existing registries and
ongoing studies should be leveraged to include standard-
ised questions about proximity tracing app usage. Such da-
ta could, for example, inform research in pillars 2 (uptake)
and 3 (adherence). By contrast, it is possible that more
technically oriented optimisation studies do not need to be
repeated for each country and setting, as many apps will be
using the same application programming interface (API)
specifications of Google and Apple [26]. It is therefore im-
portant to make such technical studies and data publicly
accessible.
Gathering data while preserving privacy
The decentralised privacy-preserving protocols of the
SwissCovid DP-3T protocol [7] limit the data that can be
used for research. The design of the app follows a privacy-
by-design approach and implements important data pro-
tection principles such as data minimisation and purpose
limitation. Only data that are strictly needed to fulfil the
primary purpose of the system, to provide a mechanism to
anonymously alert the exposed contacts of an index case,
leave the users’ device. Proximity tracing apps that pro-
vide strong data privacy and security properties are thought
to increase trust and better adoption rates by the popula-
tion, an important factor in the effectiveness of proximity
tracing as an intervention [7]. The strong data protection
measures also encourage uptake by communities for whom
sharing data with central services might be a concern.
To allow for effective evaluation of proximity tracing sys-
tems whilst respecting privacy, some countries, such as
Switzerland, have regulated the use of data stored on the
central server, allowing their use for statistical purposes
[27]. In Switzerland, the data available for evaluations is
limited to the app user-triggered confirmation of a positive
RT-PCR test result, this person’s non-identifiable ephemer-
al IDs, as well as the date of positive test and/or the date
of first symptoms [27]. Other data, such as the list of a per-
son’s anonymous contacts over the past days are stored lo-
cally on app users’ phones and are inaccessible. Thus, they
cannot be used for analytic purposes.
Systematic evaluations of proximity tracing app effective-
ness therefore need to collect data from other sources.
Classic contact tracing provides data such as the number of
informed contacts of index cases and COVID-19 symptom
development among those identified contacts. Routine sur-
veillance provides information about numbers of newly di-
agnosed cases per day, etc. There are, however, challenges
for linkage of data from different sources for technical rea-
sons, such as access restrictions, and legal reasons, such
as privacy concerns regarding the use of information from
classical contact tracing, or due to anonymisation, that is,
lack of individual-level identifiers that would allow data-
base connections. Potential solutions include conducting
analyses at geographically aggregated levels, such as num-
bers of deaths or hospitalisations, to include some vari-
ables as exogenous or aggregated, e.g., percentage of app
users in a given region.
The need for additional primary data collection
Primary data collection through surveys (or by making use
of existing studies) will be essential for some of the re-
search questions of the proposed research agenda. For ex-
ample, to gain a deeper understanding of app uptake in
specific sociodemographic groups, additional user surveys,
or representative (randomly sampled) population surveys
will be required. Addressing questions on app downloads
(pillar 2, uptake) will be relatively straightforward, where-
as assessing responses to positive tests or alarms (pillar 3,
adherence) will be more challenging. In particular, there
is a substantial likelihood that persons may withhold the
fact that they ignored alarms or did not enter positive tests
(social desirability bias). Furthermore, depending on inci-
dence levels (the daily number of new SARS-CoV-2 cas-
es), the probability of including persons with an active
or resolved infection or persons who were warned by the
proximity tracing app in a random sample survey (e.g.,
among app users) will be quite small.
Conclusion
Hope still rests on proximity tracing apps to help contain
the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic and to sustain a version of nor-
malised social and economic life after the pandemic lock-
down in many countries. The speed of the epidemic and the
threat of a second SARS-CoV-2 wave may force health au-
thorities to take decisive actions in case infection numbers
rise again substantially. Therefore, it is likely that there
is only a limited time window for the optimisation of the
proximity tracing app and promotion of substantial popula-
tion uptake. It will be all the more important that research
programmes allow data-driven, evidence-based optimisa-
tions, and information for the public about the benefits,
harms and costs of proximity tracing apps.
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Appendix 1 Glossary of keywords
Keyword Explanation
Descriptions in quotation marks reflect unaltered quotations from the respective publication.
Reference
Acceptability Acceptability can be defined as whether stakeholders “find the App likeable, including its interface and
navigation features.”
4
Comparative effectiveness “The generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms of alternative methods
to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of care. The purpose
of CER is to assist consumers, clinicians, purchasers, and policymakers to make informed decisions that
will improve health care at both the individual and population levels.”
1
Comparator ”Participants in the control arm of a study. […] In a controlled trial, a participant in the group (receiving
placebo, no treatment, an active comparator, or standard of care) that serves as a comparator for the ex-
perimental intervention.”
1
Confounding “A variable (or characteristic) more likely to be present in one group of participants than another that is re-
lated to the outcome of interest and may potentially confuse (confound) the results.”
1
Effectiveness “The extent to which an intervention works under real-world conditions (i.e., in practice). Effectiveness
studies involving drugs examine whether they work when they are used the way that most individuals take
them. […] Effectiveness studies ask the question, Does it work?”
1
Efficacy “The extent to which an intervention produces a beneficial result under ideal conditions (i.e., in clinical tri-
als). Efficacy trials ask the question, Can it work?.”
1
Efficiency “The ratio between health system inputs (costs, in the form of labour, capital, or equipment) and either out-
puts (e.g. number of patients treated) or health outcomes (e.g. life years gained).”
3
Endpoint “Medical events occurring as a result of disease or treatment (e.g., stroke, disability, hospitalization).” 1
False-positive classification “A test result that is positive for a person who does not have the disease.” With respect to PT apps: a risk
exposure notification when in fact there was no risk.
1
Feasibility Feasibility can be defined as whether implementation of the App can be “easily and conveniently done, ac-
counting for advantages and disadvantages to integrating the application into routine workflow.”
4
Generalizability (external validity) “The extent to which results provide a correct basis for generalizations to other circumstances (e.g., popu-
lations, settings).”
1
Observational study “A study in which investigators observe the course of events and do not assign participants to the interven-
tion.”
1
Primary endpoint Endpoint addressing the main research question. They guide study planning and sample size calculations. 2
Randomisation “The process of randomly assigning participants to one of the arms of a controlled trial. Ensures that par-
ticipants have an equal and independent chance of being in each arm of the study.”
1
Reliability ”The extent to which an instrument, scale, or other type of measurement or procedure yields consistent
and reproducible results.”
1
Secondary endpoint Endpoints measured in addition to primary endpoints. “Secondary endpoints are generally not sufficient to
influence decision-making alone, but may support the claim of efficacy by demonstrating additional effects
or by supporting a causal mechanism.”
2
Sensitivity of classification “The proportion of time a diagnostic test is positive in individuals who have the disease or condition.” With
respect to PT apps: the proportion of exposure notifications when there was indeed a relevant exposure to
the virus.
1
Specificity of classification “The proportion of time a diagnostic test is negative in individuals who do not have the disease or condi-
tion.” With respect to PT apps: the proportion of contacts without subsequent exposure notification when
there was indeed no relevant exposure.
1
Study question (hypothesis) “A conjectural statement of the relation between two or more variables. A proper hypothesis should be
pre-specified, measurable, have theoretical or empirical support, be clearly articulated, and testable by an
appropriately designed study.”
1
Surrogate (or proxy) outcomes “Measurements of a patient’s physical or biomedical status used as a surrogate for, or to infer the degree
of, disease […]. Surrogate endpoints correlate with clinical outcomes but the relationship is not necessarily
definitive.”
1
Target population “The population to which the investigator wishes to generalize.” 1
Usability Usability can be defined as whether the App “functioned in a way that enhanced productivity or led to un-
productive tasks due to errors.”
4
Validity “The degree to which a result (of a measurement or study) is likely to be true and free of bias (systematic
errors).”
1
1 https://amcp.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/AMCP%20CER_glossary%208.2011.pdf2 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6881606/pdf/main.pdf3
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10213735/4 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5192299/
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